IN THE
HIGH COURT OF MALAWI
PRINCIPAL
REGISTRY
CIVIL CAUSE NUMBER 340
OF 2003
BETWEEN
JEFFREY
CHIKUMBANJE
PLAINTIFF
AND
INDEFUND LIMITED
DEFENDANT
CORAM: D F MWAUNGULU (JUDGE)
Kadwa,
legal practitioner, for the plaintiff
Masumbu,
legal practitioner, for the defendant
Machila,
official interpreter
Mwaungulu,
J
ORDER
In
this summons the defendant, Indefund Limited, want to dissolve an injunction
the plaintiff, Mr. Chikumbanje, obtained ex
parte on
The
facts are far from complex and, to the extent they resolve issues the
application raises, are as follows. The defendant is a bank to who the
plaintiff was a client of some time, at least, it so appears. The plaintiff
borrowed money from the bank on a charge of his property MC 328 (Title number
13/1). At the time of the ex parte injunction the plaintiff, according to his
affidavit, was K3, 000, 000 in arrears. It seems, from the plaintiff’s letter
of
On
3rd February the plaintiff took out this action claiming the house
and cancellation of the sale to Dr Chirwa. He obtained an ex parte injunction on an affidavit in which he swears the bank
sold the house without proper notice and under a private treaty with Dr Chirwa.
On proper notice, his letter of
In my judgment, failure to disclose a previous
action on which a court adjudicated and denial that an appropriate notice without
which a course of legal conduct cannot occur are suppression of material facts
which should undermine an injunction obtained ex parte. By nature ex parte
applications are not the normal. They carry with them a subtle danger that
orders courts make are based on a denial of another’s right to be heard. A part
from urgency they are, and that is how it should be, made at the peril of full
disclosure of material facts. Full disclosure enables a court to do the right
and the just thing. If a party discloses that previously another court
determined a matter between parties on the same subject matter, a court would
not, unless, at least, it insists for a hearing inter partes, grant an injunction ex parte. Apart, therefore, from not disclosing that the bank gave
the plaintiff proper notice, failure to disclose a previous action on the same
subject matter adjudicated by the courts, deprived the judge of material facts
on which to exercise the power to grant the injunction ex parte.
The
judge’s exercise of the power to grant the injunction ex parte was substantially undermined by the plaintiff’s suggestion
in the affidavit that the bank never gave proper notice before selling the
charged property. This created in the mind of the judge exercising the power to
grant interlocutory relief that, in exercising the power of sale, the bank
overlooked the Registered Land Act. If the bank, and in my judgment it did,
gave proper notice and the plaintiff never paid in the time the Registered Land
Act stipulates, unless before the contract of sale, the plaintiff paid the
arrears to the bank or into court, the court could not stop the sale.
Certainly, if the plaintiff had informed the judge that he had proper notice
under the Act, the judge would not have granted the injunction.
This
Court in Mkhumbwe v National Bank of
“The plaintiff questions, on several grounds,
the various notices the bank sent. The
mortgagor attacks the notice of demand of
At page 9 this Court continued as follows:
“The chargee need not inform the chargor about
the remedy he will deploy. The right springs immediately upon default on a
subsection 1 notice. The chargee need not inform the chargor the chargee will
sell the property or stipulate the time of sale. Under section 68, upon
defaulting payment for over a month, the chargee could notify the chargor to
pay. The chargee cannot appoint a receiver or sell the property until after
three months of that notice.
In Mlotha
v
“The notice under section 68 is statutory and
imposes a duty unknown to the common law. It must be restricted to the
situations it covers. It only requires the mortgagee or chargee to notify the
mortgagor or chargee and request for payment. If the mortgagor or chargeor
complies in the time stipulated, cadit questio. The mortgagee or charger
has no further duty if the mortgagor or charger never complies with the notice.
The
mortgagee or charger can sell the property privately, without notifying the
mortgagor or charger. If, as happened here, the mortgagee or charger sells by
public auction, there is notice of the sale to the charger or mortgagor. The charger
or mortgagor cannot complain of not being informed when the mortgagor or
mortgagee advertised the sale. A public auction is an advertisement to all,
including the mortgagor or chargeor.
The plaintiff’s
affidavit only suggests the bank’s notices were improper. The plaintiff never
disclosed the notices were to the court. If they were, the court would have
discovered they complied with the Act.
The bank, after fully complying with the
Act, could, and actually did, properly exercise the power of sale. The
plaintiff when applying for the injunction ex
parte deposed that at the time of sale the bank had in fact sold the
property. The plaintiff could not therefore prevent the sale or successfully
annul the sale. This case is like the cases of Trustees of the Estate of Isaac Leo Douglas Kaunda v
“I do not
think however that Dancwerts, L.J., suggests that a court would, where there is
no sale in fact, restrain by injunction a chargee’s or mortgagee’s exercise of
power of sale where the chargor or mortgagor defaults and never pays arrears to
the chargee or mortgagee or into court. If it were so, the chargee or mortgagee
may never easily or at all exercise the power of sale for it is the default
that triggers the power in the first place… A chargor or mortgagor has,
therefore, up to the date of the contract in all other contracts or at the fall
of the hammer on an auction, to pay arrears and restrain the mortgagor or
charger from exercising the power of sale. If the mortgagor or mortgagor does
not pay before a contract of sale to the mortgagee or chargee or into court, a
court will not restrain by injunction the lawful exercise of the power of
sale.”
In Mkhumbwe v National Bank of
“The
contract is an absolute contract, not conditional in any way, and the sale is
expressed to be made by the company as mortgagee. If, before the date of the contract, the
plaintiff had tendered the principal with interest and costs, or had paid it
into Court proceedings, then, if the company had continued to take steps to
enter into a contract for sale, or had purported to do so, the plaintiff would,
in my opinion, have been entitled to an injunction restraining it from doing
so. After a contract has been entered
into, however, it is, in my judgement, perfectly clear (subject to what has
been said to me to-day) that the mortgagee (in the present case, the company)
can be restrained from completing only on the ground that he has not acted in
good faith and that the sale is therefore liable to be set aside.”
Crossman, J.,
states the reason for the rule:
“In my
judgment, s. 101 of that Act, which gives to a mortgagee power to sell the
mortgaged property, is perfectly clear, and means that the mortgagee has power
to sell out and out, by private contract or by auction, and subsequently to
complete by conveyance; and the power to sell is, I think, a power by selling
to bind the mortgagor. If that were not
so, the extra-ordinary result would follow that every purchaser from a
mortgagee would, in effect, be getting a conditional contract liable at any
time to be set aside by the mortgagor’s coming in and paying the principal,
interest, and costs. Such a result would
make it impossible for a mortgagee, in the ordinary course of events, to sell
unless he was in a position to promise that completion should take place immediately
or on the day after the contract, and there would have to be a rush for
completion in order to defeat a possible claim by the mortgagor.”
Where the matter reached, the Court could not, therefore, by injunction restrain
the sale. As the cases of Trustees of the
Estate of Isaac Leo Douglas Kaunda v New Building Society, and Mkhumbwe v National Bank of Malawi, assuming
the bank wrongly exercised the power of sale, show, the
plaintiff’s remedy lay in damages. A court does not as, a matter of course,
grant an interlocutory injunction where damages are an adequate remedy unless,
of course, a party cannot pay them. Even on the plaintiff’s affidavit, there
was no triable issue to justify granting the injunction and the plaintiff would
not have gotten a permanent injury at the end of trial.
I therefore allow the application to dissolve the injunction obtained ex parte on
Made this 28th Day of April 2003.
D F Mwaungulu
JUDGE