IN THE MALAWI SUPREME COURT OF
APPEAL
AT
BLANTYRE
MSCA CIVIL APPEAL NO. 40
OF 2000
(Being High Court,
Lilongwe District Registry
Civil Cause No.
733 of 1998)
BETWEEN:
GROUP
VILLAGE HEADMAN KAKOPA..............1ST APPELLANT
- and -
TSAKULANI
JONISI
KASAMBWE.......................2ND
APPELLANT
- and -
GROUP
VILLAGE HEADMAN THUMBA
(On their own Behalf and
on Behalf of
Others)..........................................3RD APPELLANTS
-
and -
LOTANI
NJERESA CHILOZI...........................1ST RESPONDENT
- and -
THE
ATTORNEY
GENERAL...........................2ND
RESPONDENT
BEFORE: THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
THE HONOURABLE MR
JUSTICE KALAILE, JA
THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE
MRS MSOSA, JA
Makono, Counsel for the
Appellants
Counsel for the
Respondents, Absent
Mbekwani (Mrs), Court
Interpreter
J U D
G M E N T
Kalaile, JA
This appeal arises
from proceedings brought by way of Originating Summons against the respondents
who are Lotani Njeresa Chilozi and the Attorney General. The appellants are Kakopa, Tsakulani Jonisi
Kasambwe and Group Village Headman Thumba.
The Originating
Summons were couched in the following terms:
(a) a declaration or order that Lotani Njeresa
Chilozi, enthroned Traditional Authority Kabudula on 19th September,
1998, is not entitled to the throne and therefore be dethroned;
(b) a declaration or order that the manner in
which the Minister of Local Government and District Administration and the
District Commissioner for Lilongwe handled the matter of installing Lotani
Njeresa Chilozi was unprocedural, irregular and therefore contrary to section
200 of the Constitution of Malawi and section 4 of the Chiefs Act;
(c) a declaration or order that the ceremony of
installing Lotani Njeresa Chilozi held on 19th September, 1998 is
null and void;
(d) an order of mandumus requiring the
President, if necessary, to appoint persons to inquire into the removal from
office of T/A Kabudula, Lotani Njeresa Chilozi in accordance with section 11(2)
of the Chiefs Act;
(e) an order by the Court for further and other
reliefs as it shall deem necessary and fair in the circumstances; and
(f) an order for costs to the appellants.
The trial Court
declined to grant any of the reliefs sought after perusing the affidavit
evidence given by both parties and upon hearing their written submissions in
Chamber. The appellants thereafter
filed the following grounds of appeal before this Court. The amended Notice of Appeal stated that:
(a) The learned Judge erred in law in holding
that, in appointing Lotani Njeresa Chilozi, the President never breached the
provisions of section 200 of the Constitution in the circumstances where he
(the Judge) wrongly refused to accept the appellants’ evidence supporting their
claim that in the first place the appointment of late Dickson Chilozi to the
office of T/A Kabudula was not in accordance with customary law of the area of
T/A Kabudula.
(b) The learned Judge erred in law in
misinterpreting section 4(2) of the Chiefs Act to mean that majority support
for Lotani Njeresa Chilozi to the entitlement to the throne of T/A Kabudula was
determined by the majority vote of Group Village Headmen.
(c) The learned Judge misdirected himself in
holding that there are two parallel customs governing succession to Kabudula
Chieftaincy in the absence of independent expert evidence in local Chewa customs
in Kabudula area and therefore his finding for the respondents that the
President had a discretion to appoint any nominees from either of the two
customs was without proper basis.
(d) The learned Judge misdirected himself in
disregarding the appellants’ evidence to the effect that matters of chieftaincy
in Kabudula area cannot be determined by a vote.
We are now going to
deal with the appeal by taking each of the grounds of appeal in turn. This approach may not follow how Counsel
presented his skeleton arguments. Mr
Makono, who represented the appellants in this appeal, argued the first ground
by stating that the late Dickson Chilozi was not appointed Traditional
Authority Kabudula in accordance with customary law. It was his argument that the appointment was in breach of section
200 of the Constitution. That section
states:
“Except in so
far as they are inconsistent with this Constitution, all Acts of Parliament,
common law and customary law in force on the appointed day shall continue to
have force of law as if they had been made in accordance with and in pursuance
of this Constitution:
Provided that
any laws correctly in force may be amended or repealed by an Act of Parliament
or be declared unconstitutional by a competent court.”
According to Counsel,
the Court below ignored the long succession history of the Kabudula Chieftaincy
which commenced with Kabudula Mbalame.
Counsel went on to state that the succession line from the Kakopa family
(to which Kabudula Mbalame belonged) was derailed by the Malawi Congress Party
Government which in 1979 rejected a nephew from the Kakopa family because the
said nephew belonged to the Jehovah’s Witness sect. This is how the late Dickson Chilozi became Traditional Authority
Kabudula, since he was a secretary of the local Malawi Congress Party
branch. The late Dickson Chilozi took
over the Chieftaincy from the late Kabudula Safari.
Mr Manyungwa, who
appeared for the respondents, replied by arguing that the appointment of the
first respondent to the Kabudula
Chieftaincy was legally
conducted and in compliance
with section 200 of the Constitution as read
with section 4 of the Chiefs Act.
Section 4 of the Chiefs Act provides that:
“4-(1) The President may by writing under his hand
appoint to the office of Paramount Chief or Chief such person as he shall
recognize as being entitled to such office.
(2) No person shall be recognized under this
section unless the President is satisfied that such person -
(a) is entitled to hold the office under
customary law; and
(b) has the support of the majority of the
people in the area of jurisdiction of the office in question.”
It was Mr Manyungwa’s
contention that the appointment of the first respondent was conducted in
compliance with the local Chewa tradition and the appellants did not tender any
evidence to prove that the appointment of the first respondent was not in
accordance with the local Chewa tradition.
It is the respondents’
case that when the late Kabudula Dickson died, it became necessary to appoint a
successor under Chewa custom; an heir
to a chieftaincy can either be a brother or a nephew of the deceased chief. The deceased Chief, the Court was informed,
had no nephew who was old enough to inherit the Chieftaincy. The only successors, therefore, could only
come from his brothers. The first
respondent was such a brother.
Local tradition
further required that women from the deceased’s family should nominate a
successor. The third defence witness
(who was a woman) testified in the Court below that she was among the women who
deliberated and nominated the first respondent to the Chieftaincy. She stated that the appointment and nomination
was not influenced by any outsider, and, at no point did they consider the name
of the second appellant.
As required by
tradition, the first respondent’s name was given to a “nkhoswe”, namely,
Traditional Authority Chitukula, who took the name to the District Commissioner
for Lilongwe. This, therefore,
demonstrates that the first respondent was appointed in accordance with
customary law as required by section 4(2)(a) of the Chiefs Act. Furthermore, the provisions of section
4(2)(b), which state that the appointed chief must have the support of the
majority of the people in the area of jurisdiction of the office in question,
were also satisfied, in that, as the Court below observed, the Kabudula area
has seventeen Group Village Headmen.
Fourteen of these Group Village Headmen endorsed the nomination of the
first respondent and only three out of the seventeen endorsed the name of the
second appellant. It is clear,
therefore, that the statutory
requirements of section 4(2)(b) of the Chiefs Act were complied with in the
appointment of the first respondent as Traditional Authority Kabudula.
The appellants’
contention that the late Dickson Chilozi was made Traditional Authority by
virtue of his position as secretary of the local Malawi Congress Party branch,
is to us, irrelevant. The appellants
should have challenged the late Dickson Chilozi’s appointment when he was alive
by invoking the provisions of section 11(2) of the Chiefs Act, instead of
waiting until the provisions of section 4(2)(a) and (b) had been complied with.
Section 11(2) of the
Chiefs Act stipulates:
“Where the
President deems it expedient to cause an inquiry to be made into a question of
the removal of any person from the
office of Paramount Chief, Chief or Sub-Chief, he may by writing under his hand
suspend such person from the performance of the functions of his office.”
Furthermore, section
12 of the Chiefs Act provides that:
“The
President may appoint persons to inquire into any question relating to the
appointment to or removal from the office of Paramount Chief, Chief or
Sub-Chief of any person and to report and make recommendations thereon to the
President.”
As the trial Court
observed, the powers provided for in sections 11 and 12 of the Chiefs act are
discretionary. We further observe that,
the appellants should have taken the initiative, immediately after the present
Constitution was adopted, to influence the office of the President to remove
late Dickson Chilozi who was installed Chief Kabudula in 1979. By waiting until after Dickson Chilozi died,
and, further waiting until the first respondent was installed on 19th
September 1998 in compliance with customary law as well as the provisions of
section 4 of the Chiefs Act, we are unable to consider the appellants’ prayer
to remove the first respondent from the Chieftaincy.
This disposes of
grounds 1(a) and 1(b) of the grounds of appeal.
The next ground of
appeal is 1(c), which is that the learned trial Judge misdirected himself in
holding that there are two parallel customs governing succession to the
Kabudula Chieftaincy in the absence of independent expert evidence in the local
Chewa customs in Kabudula area, and, therefore, his finding for the respondents
that the President had a discretion to appoint any nominee from either of the
two customs, was without proper basis.
Upon reading the
judgment of the trial Court, we are unable to agree with this finding by the
Court below. Our opinion is that the
custom advanced by the appellants would apply if the wrongly appointed chief is
to be removed timely. But where the
so-called illegally appointed chief is allowed to reign for almost twenty years
and a new chief is appointed according to the local customary law, this Court
will be unwilling to assist the appellants.
The appellants are deemed to have acquiesced to the situation. As we observed earlier on, such an
application to remove the wrongly appointed chief should have been made as soon
as the opportunity to do so arose.
The final ground of
appeal was that the learned Judge misdirected himself in disregarding the
appellants’ evidence, to the effect that matters of chieftaincy in Kabudula
area cannot be determined by a vote.
This ground of appeal cannot succeed, because all what the trial Judge
was stating was that the provisions of section 4(2)(b) of the Chiefs Act were
complied with, especially since the local customary law on the appointment of a
chief was also strictly adhered to.
This appeal fails in
its entirety with costs to the respondents.
DELIVERED in Open
Court this 11th day of July 2001, at Blantyre.
Sgd ................................................
R A
BANDA, CJ
Sgd ................................................
J B
KALAILE, JA
Sgd ................................................
A S
E MSOSA, JA