IN THE MALAWI SUPREME COURT OF
APPEAL
AT
BLANTYRE
MSCA CIVIL APPEAL NO. 29
OF 1999
(Being High Court Civil Cause
No. 3151 of 1999)
BETWEEN:
MRS
JESSICA MZAZA
SOMANJE.............................APPELLANT
-
and
DAISY
SOMANJE, HELGA SOMANJE,
TIMOTHY
SOMANJE, EURITA SOMANJE............RESPONDENTS
BEFORE: THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JA
THE HONOURABLE MR
JUSTICE UNYOLO, JA
THE HONOURABLE MR
JUSTICE MTEGHA, JA
Mtawali, Counsel for
the Appellant
Salimu, Counsel for
the Respondents
Mbekwani (Mrs),
Official Recorder/Interpreter
J U D
G M E N T
Unyolo, JA
This appeal emanates
from a dispute as to who should apply for letters of administration in the
estate of one, Harvey Robert Kulucheta Somanje, hereinafter referred to as “the
deceased”.
After a long illness,
the deceased instructed Messrs Wilson & Morgan, a firm of legal
practitioners, to draft his will. A
lawyer in the said firm duly drafted the will and made arrangements for the
deceased to come with his two witnesses the next Monday, on 1st June
1999, for the formal attestation to the document. Unfortunately, as fate had it, the deceased died in the early
hours of Sunday, 30th May 1999.
A dispute then arose
in the aftermath of the deceased’s passing as to who was to apply for the grant
of letters of administration, the deceased having died intestate, as we have
seen. There were two opposing sides,
namely, the appellant, who is the deceased’s widow, and the respondents, who
are the deceased’s children from an earlier marriage. The appellant’s position was that she should administer the
estate herself, or that, if that was not acceptable to the other side, then the
parties’ legal practitioners should apply for the grant of the said letters of
administration. The respondents’
position, on the other hand, was that the administration of the estate should
be granted to the National Bank of Malawi (Financial Management Services)
because of the Bank’s expertise in the field of administration of deceased
estates, and also because of its perceived neutrality in such matters. The parties failed to agree, whereupon the
respondents initiated proceedings in the Court below seeking a declaratory
order of the Court that the said Bank was best suited to be granted letters of
administration.
The matter was tried
in the Court below by way of affidavit evidence, and the intended will was
exhibited, apparently to show what the deceased had wished in relation to who
should be the executors and trustees of the estate. Clause 1 of the intended will shows that the deceased wanted the
said National Bank of Malawi (Financial Management Services) to be the sole
executors and trustees of the will.
The learned Judge in
the Court below appreciated the fact that in the absence of full attestation,
the intended will herein was not a will, in the legal sense. He, however, took the view that the Court
could, nevertheless, look at the document to answer the question who the
deceased intended to be the executors and trustees of his will. This is what the learned Judge actually said
on this aspect:
“However the
contents of this draft tells a story I cannot ignore. Had the will been legally executed there is no doubt late Somanje
would have wanted the National Bank of Malawi appointed as sole Executors and
Trustees of his will. I referred myself
to the case of Re Jebb 1. [1967] ch. 666 where the construction
of a will was the main issue.
There Lord
Denning said this;
‘In
constructing a will we have to look at it as the testator did, sitting in his
armchair, with all the circumstances known to him at the time. Then we have to ask ourselves: “what did he
intend?” We ought not to answer this
question by reference to any technical rules of law. Those technical rules have only too often led the courts astray
in the construction of wills.’
Now looking
at the draft will of late Somanje, I want to pose the same question. With all the circumstances known to late
Somanje at the time the draft was drawn what did he intend? I find no problem in answering that
question. He intended to appoint the
National Bank of Malawi as the sole executors and trustees of his estate. The fact that the draft will was not legally
executed does not mean we should ignore the contents of this draft. In this unexecuted document, in my view,
late Somanje wished his property to be disposed of by the National Bank. No one else.”
Further, the learned
Judge pointed out that since the parties were at “loggerheads” and that both
had an interest in getting a share of the estate, it would not be prudent to
grant letters of administration to any one of them. He took the view that a “neutral” person ought to be appointed,
and proceeded to appoint the said National Bank of Malawi (Financial Management
Services) to be the receiver of the deceased estate pending the grant of
letters of administration. Accordingly,
the learned Judge granted the respondents’ prayer and ordered each party to pay
its own costs.
It is against that
decision that the appellant appeals to this Court. The crux of the appellant’s case is that the decision herein
cannot be supported because the same was based on the contents of an unattested
draft will which, in law, was not a will.
The secondary matter raised is that the learned Judge erred in ordering,
as he did, that each party should pay its own costs. It was contended that the Court should instead have ordered that
the estate pay the costs.
In response, Counsel for
the respondents submitted that he was unable to join with the learned Judge in
basing his decision on the contents of an unattested draft will. Counsel submitted that the respondents,
nevertheless, wished the lower Court’s decision to be upheld, but on different
grounds. He relied in this regard on
Order III, rule 3 of the Supreme Court of Appeal Rules. Counsel contended that the said National
Bank of Malawi (Financial Management Services) was best suited for the grant of
letters of administration because it is a trust corporation with expertise in
the administration of deceased estates, and that the lower Court’s order in
that sense cannot be faulted in the circumstances.
The crisp question for
the determination of this Court is whether the Court below was right in having
recourse to the draft will, to find out who the deceased intended to be his
executors and trustees and then use that information as the basis for deciding
who should be granted letters of administration. Our answer to the
question is in the negative. To start
with, it is clear that the draft will herein was, by operation of law, not a
will at all, since it was not signed or attested. That is why we say that the deceased died intestate, that is,
without leaving a will. Needless to
point out that in the form it is, the draft will cannot be used for purposes of
finding out how the deceased intended his estate should be administered upon
his death. In the same vein, the
document cannot be used to find out who the deceased intended the said draft
will to be his executors and trustees.
We just cannot simply pick and choose, as it were.
It is also noted that
the reliance which the lower Court put on the Re Jebb case cited above
was misplaced. A proper reading of the passage
quoted by the Court below from the case shows that the remarks there were made
in a case in which there was a will and the court was dealing with the question
of the construction of the will. It is
of course different in the present case, where, as we have repeatedly said,
there was no will.
The result is that the
decision of the Court below on this point, based, as it was, on information
contained in an unattested will, was, in our judgment, and on all the facts of
the case, flawed and we are unable to support it on that basis.
Section 42 of the
Wills and Inheritance Act is pertinent.
The section provides that letters of administration where the deceased
has died intestate may be granted to any beneficiary of the deceased estate. The section goes on to say that where more
than one person applies for letters of administration, the court has a
discretion to make a grant to any one or more of them, and in such case, the
court has to take into account greater and immediate interests in the deceased estate
in priority to lesser or more remote interests. Further, and this is very important, the section, in subsection
(4) thereof, provides that where it appears to the court to be necessary or
convenient to appoint some person to administer the estate, other than the
person who, under ordinary circumstances, would be entitled to a grant of
administration, the court may, in its discretion, having regard, inter alia,
to the safety of the estate and probability that it will be properly
administered, appoint such person as it thinks fit to be administrator.
As earlier pointed
out, the parties in the present case failed to agree among themselves and also
in the presence of their respective legal practitioners as to who should apply
for the letters of administration. Each
party mistrusted the other. It is also to be noted that there are minors
in this case whose interests must be properly and sufficiently guarded and
protected.
On the total facts, we
are of the view that this is a proper case in which the court should invoke the
provisions of the said section 42(4) above mentioned. We cannot agree more with Counsel for the respondents that the
National Bank of Malawi (Financial Management Services) is best suited for the
granting of letters of administration, having regard to its status as a trust
corporation and the indisputable expertise it has in the administration of
deceased estates. We also have no
reason to doubt the Bank’s neutrality in the matter.
In the result, we
support the appointment of the said National Bank of Malawi (Financial
Management Services) as interim receivers and the grant of letters of
administration to it. The decision of
the Court below is therefore upheld, but on this different ground.
We now turn to the
appeal against the order for costs.
With respect, we do not see any real merit in the appeal on this
point. It is trite that costs are a
discretionary matter for the court.
Admittedly, the discretion must be exercised judicially and in
accordance with reason, fairness and justice.
It is clear that the Court below made the order in an effort to preserve
the monies that would be available for distribution to the beneficiaries during
the administration of the estate. We
support the order.
Accordingly, the
appeal fails, and it is dismissed. As
in the Court below, each party will pay its own costs of the appeal.
DELIVERED in open
Court this 13th day of November 2001, at Blantyre.
Sgd ...............................................
R A
BANDA, CJ
Sgd ................................................
L E
UNYOLO, JA
Sgd ................................................
H M
MTEGHA, JA