IN THE HIGH
COURT OF MALAWI
PRINCIPAL
REGISTRY
CIVIL CAUSE NO.
2046 OF 1995
BETWEEN:
K.CHABWERA.................................................................PLAINTIFF
and
TUWICHE
BUS SERVICE
LIMITED............................DEFENDANT
CORAM: TEMBO, J
Maulidi, of Counsel for the Plaintiff
Jumbe (Mrs), of Counsel for the Defendant
Katunga (Mrs), Official Interpreter
JUDGMENT
Tembo, J. The plaintiff’s claim is for damages for
wrongful and unlawful dismissal from employment. The defendant denies any liability therefor. It has been pleaded, in its defence, that
there were express terms of the contract of employment in respect of which the
plaintiff was in breach and for which he has been dismissed summarily by the
defendant.
During trial, the
court only received the evidence of the plaintiff. The defendant did not attend trial, even after the court had
adjourned the hearing twice, in order, to allow counsel for the defendant to
organize her witnesses therefor.
In the circumstances,
the facts of the case are as follows: The plaintiff was initially employed in
the capacity of Bus Inspector on 19th July, 1988. He remained in
employment for approximately eight years, thus until 19th September,
1995, when the defendant decided to terminate his contract of employment. During his employment, the plaintiff had a
successful career. By the date when his
contract of employment was terminated, the plaintiff had risen to the rank of
Assistant Chief Inspector, at which he received a monthly salary of K763.40,
which was threefold the monthly salary for his first appointment in July, 1988.
The letter of
termination did not disclose any reasons therefor. Clause Number 5 of the defendant’s Staff Conditions of Service
makes
provision for termination of appointment as
follows:
Employment of
confirmed employees may be terminated by either party by giving one month
notice in writing or payment of one month salary in lieu of notice.
The letter of termination dated 19th
September, 1995 was as follows:
Dear Mr. Chabwera
Re: Termination of
Service
I regret to inform you
that management has decided to terminate your service as a Traffic Inspector
with effect from 11th September, 1995.
Please arrange to collect
your salary for 1 - 11 September, 1995, on 30th September, 1995 in
the Accounts Office.
Yours faithfully,
for Tuwiche Bus
Service Limited
H.J. Malenga
EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN
In the light of these
facts, the plaintiff in his statement of claim and indeed by what he said
during trial is claiming the following reliefs from the defendant: salary and
notice pay; pension scheme contribution; overtime payment; annual leave
entitlement.
This case raises
issues of law applicable upon the termination of a private contract of employment. In the case of Dr. B.S. Chawani -v- The
Attorney General MSCA Civil Appeal Cause No. 620 of 1997 (Unreported),
after reviewing case authorities respecting the applicable common law to
private contracts, Honourable Mr.
Justice Tambala J.A. in delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal
said this -
To sum up, the
following principles emerge from the case authorities which have been examined:
(1) where an employee has wrongly, but clearly, terminated a contract of
employment, the termination is effective, although it is in breach of contract;
(2) the relationship of employer and employee is brought to an end, following a
clear termination of contract of employment; (3) where there is a wrongful, but
clear termination of a contract of employment, the dismissed employee cannot
insist that the contract of employment still subsists and cannot sue for
specific performance of the contract; (4) the dismissed employee cannot sue for
the salary or wages which he could have earned if the employer had not
wrongfully terminated the contract because a salary or wages must be earned;
(5) as the relationship of employer and employee is brought to an end the
dismissed employee cannot claim the reward for services which are no
longer rendered; (6) when there is a
breach of contract, the innocent party is entitled to be compensated only for
the defendant’s failure to perform his legal obligations. The law of contract is concerned only with
legal obligations, created by mutual agreement, and not with expectations,
however reasonable those expectations might be; (7) an employee cannot be
granted damages for loss of expected benefits to which he had no contractual
right; and (8) as regards the measure of damages, an employee who is wrongfully
dismissed gets damages which cover the period which he would have served, if he
had been given proper notice.
Reverting to the
instant case, it is quite clear that clause 5, on termination of appointment,
allows either party to terminate the contract upon giving a month notice in
writing therefor or upon payment of a month salary in lieu of notice. The evidence in the case does not indicate
that the defendant had done or fulfilled either of the conditions precedent to
the termination of the contract. In the
circumstances the plaintiff’s claim for payment of notice pay succeeds.
However, the plaintiff’s claim for salary other than
that for notice pay should fail. In
view of the law, it does not matter that the defendant did not effect the termination in the prescribed
manner, thus by giving a month notice therefor or by making payment to the
plaintiff of a month salary in lieu of notice.
What is essential is that the defendant clearly terminated the contract,
though in breach of the contract in that it did not give notice or make payment
in lieu of notice. The termination is
effective. In that regard a letter of
termination set out herein above is the evidence in point. Besides, following the termination, the
plaintiff in fact henceforth stopped offering his services as Assistant Chief
Inspector or in any other capacity whatsoever.
He cannot, therefore, claim to be paid salary for a period during which
no services were rendered to the defendant by him. In the circumstances, the plaintiff did not earn the salary which
he now claims to be paid. Consequently,
in that regard, his claim must fail and is dismissed accordingly.
The plaintiff’s claim
for overtime payment is for the amount of K3,195.12 as shown in Exh.P13. It is the testimony, and thus the evidence
of the plaintiff, that he used to work during public holidays throughout the
period of his employment with the defendant.
The work was then undertaken at the instructions of the Executive
Chairman. However no overtime payment
had been effected by the date of termination of the contract. No evidence in rebuttal has been adduced on
the part of the defendant. To the
extent that the court has in fact afforded more than adequate opportunity to
the defendant for it to present its own version of the story on this point,
which the defendant has declined to avail itself, the court accepts the
plaintiff’s claim for overtime payment.
It is so ordered.
Besides the foregoing,
the court allows the plaintiff’s claim for payment in lieu of leave days
which the plaintiff would have taken out during the entire period of his
employment, as shown in Exh.P14. Clause 10 of the defendant’s Staff Conditions
of Service prescribes annual leave entitlements for the servants of the
defendants. The plaintiff was entitled
to 14 days annual leave. For the entire
period of his employment, until the date of termination, the plaintiff was not
given authority to proceed on leave.
Yes, this clause also prescribes that leave may not be accumulated
except as and when management may specify.
Further, that pay in lieu of leave will not be granted except where
management think fit. In the case of
the plaintiff, the defendant did not authorize him to proceed on leave, but
instead he was by the defendant expressly instructed to report for duties each
time the plaintiff sought defendant’s authorization for him to proceed on
leave. In so far as the defendant
expressly required the plaintiff to report on duty when in fact the plaintiff
ought then to have been allowed to proceed on leave, the defendant must be
deemed to have allowed the accumulation of plaintiff’s leave days over the
years and also to have sanctioned the payment of cash therefor in lieu of
leave. No evidence to the contrary was given by the defendant so as to persuade
the court to hold otherwise on this point.
In the premises, the court allows the plaintiff’s claim for an amount of
K1,303.07 in lieu of leave, as shown in Exh.P14.
Concerning refund of
pension scheme contribution, the court’s view is that this claim must
fail. The plaintiff has not proved to
the satisfaction of the court that he is entitled to a refund in an amount
exceeding K323.19, as shown in Exh. P15. This was an amount which the defendant paid to the plaintiff
respecting an amount due for a refund of pension scheme contribution. The plaintiff merely told the court that he
remembered that he was deducted K37.00 monthly for pension scheme
contribution. No evidence by way of pay
slips or payment vouchers had been adduced to establish that fact or the extent
of the amount then due for refund. It would
seem that the plaintiff has not been able to prove on a balance of probabilities
that he is entitled to a refund in the amount in excess of that which he
already was paid, as evidenced by Exh.P.15.
In the circumstances, that claim must be dismissed and it is so ordered.
Costs are for the
Plaintiff.
PRONOUNCED in open court this
Wednesday, 4th day of July,
2001 at Blantyre.
A.
K. Tembo
JUDGE